Introduction
Violence perpetrated by Muslim radicals is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia and was common from time to time during Soehartos autho, ritarian regime (1966, 1998) . In fact it is often argued that the Soeharto regimes severe repression of political Islam contributed to the radicalization of Muslim dissents. While the Muslim mainstream has welcomed the democratization of Indonesia since Soehartos fall in 1998, a small radical East Asia, within which Shariah would be implemented. Inspired by al, Ikhwan al�Muslimun of Egypt, he asserted that the struggle for an Islamic state is a step,by,step process starting with the moral self,improvement of the members until they are able to form a family (usrah) of like,minded people. These are the crucial si:eps toward the building of an Islamic com, munity (jemaah Islamiyah), which is a precondition for the establishment of an Islamic state ( van Bruinessen, 2002: 7) . However, recruiting potential members of JI is a slow process, developing over time as the recruiters slowly assessed the dedication of the recruit. The recruitment process occurred in phases. The first phase involved screening individuals, including their family background and knowledge of Islam. Once the recruits are selected, they will be enrolled at boarding schools and madrasahs for further training. The next phase is a physical and military tr�ining in either al,Qaeda camps in Afghanistan or in MILF camp of Hudaibiyah in Mindanao, Philippines. While the recruits belong to various social levels, they have the commonality of being angry with what is happening to Muslims (Abuza, 2003: 131) .
Actions and Network of Jemaah Islami y ah
During the period of early 1980s to the mid 1990s, JI has sent more than 300 Indonesians to foreign mujahidin camps, especially to Afghanistan where they got military training under Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan commander who had the closest ties to Saudi Arabia and Osama bin Laden. It is important to note in this regard that JI did not exist as an organization when Sungkar started to send Indonesian fighters to Afghanistan. A small number of them were trained at the camps of other Afghan leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jamil al, Rahman. It was in Afghanistan that JI members learnt the skills necessary for their military actions, such as bomb making, use of armaments, and covert operation technique. Using the skills gained in the crucible of the war in Afghanistan, JI developed a.formalized structure to provide systematic training for its new recruits from across the region. In May 1996, Sungkar and some of the Afghan veterans con,soli, dated the structure of]I regional operations similar to a military structure, and documented it in a book often referred to as Pedoman Perjuangan al, Jamaah aUslamiyah (General Guideline for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle, PUP JI). According to PUPJI, Jis regional operations are divided into three main Mantiqis (Region or Brigade). Each Mantiqi is broken down into Wakalah (battalion), Khatibah (company), Qird�s (platoon), and Fiah (squad). Each Mantiqi is assigned to operation in certain areas. Mantiqi I covers peninsular Malaysia and Singapore; Mantiqi II covers Java, Sumatra and most of eastern Indonesia; Mantiqi III covers Sabah, East Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Mindanao; Mantiqi IY, which has never been realized, has been generally described as covering Papua and Australia. (Abas, 2003: 108) . Apart from military training, Indonesian mujahidin were also provided · with religious and ideological indoctrination. As with many of the Saudi funded camps, there was a heavy focus on salafi teaching, though of a jihadist · bent. The term salafi is used to describe a movement that seeks to return to the purity of the religion as practiced by the Prophet and the two generation following him. Salafi movement is characterized by the emphasis on purifying Islam from deviations sucl;i as idolatry (shir k),. unwar-ranted innovation (bidah) and superstition (khurafat). However, contem-porary salafi movement is a form of reconstituted Wahhabism, owing to the determination of its proponents to more systematically introduce the thought formulated by the three main classical references among Wahhabis, namely Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawjiyyah (1292-1350) and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). Also taught in the camp is Abdullah Azzams ideas, which echoes Ibn Taymiyahs arguments that jihad means armed struggle and that it was legitimate to wage jihad against Muslim rulers who deviate from true Islam or refuse to enforce shariah. Ibn Taymiyah was · an important fourteenth century theologian. He cultivated the idea that Muslim rulers who con-travened Islam should be labeledkuffar (unbelievers), and it is incumbent upon Muslims to wage jihad to overthrow kuff ar rulers. This idea resonates with that of Darul . Islam movement whose struggle to uphold shariah, let alone establish an Islamic state, were repressed by Soeharto regime Qones, 2003: 3) . This indoctrination of jihadist idea provides JI members a powerful religious sanction for the use of violence to gain their goal. Jis members were taught about the need to wage jihad as a way of becoming a good Muslim. The book used in jihad training talks about the necessity of using violence in describes the situation of the Muslim world under the secular nationalist regimes as being in a state of ignorance and barbarism, and this undoubtedly provoked the consciousness oflslamists to resist the established order and devise actions that were aimed to overturn and transform it (Ayubi, 1991: 131) . Therefore it is scarcely surprising to say that JI is a product of international jihadist forces given the back,ground of many of its leaders, its ideological orientation, and its well esta,blished links with foreign militant· Muslim networks, most notably that of al,Qaeda. This network would later prove critical to Jis ability to mount large, well,coordinated operations. The Christmas Eve bombing of December 2000 is often cited as an example of the well,organized attack and professionalism ofJI field operatives. The coordination in the bombings was impressive in which the explosions went off at around the same time in over 30 churches in 11 cities throughout Indonesia Gones, 2005a: 5).
Following the fall of Soeharto regime in 1998, hundreds of radical Muslim exiles, mostly from Malaysia and Philippines, returned home and demanded political space. Sungkar and Baasyir threw themselves into the new political environment, feverishly working to build up followers committed to turning the post,Soeharto government into an Islamic state. After the natural death of Sungkar in 1999, Baasyir took over leadership of the organization. It was at this point that the division within JI began to appear because many of the younger and more radical members of JI were unhappy with the leadership ofBaasyir. The division within the organization widened when Baasyir accepted the leadership of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council) in August 2000. Post, Soeharto Indonesia heralded a new openness for Islamic organization within the country. Baasyir felt that the time was right to take advantage of the new political climate. MMI is ostensibly a civil society organization that tries to implement shariah peacefully and through the democratic process (Abuza, 2003: 141,142) . MII headquarter locates at Karanglo Street no. 123, Yogyakarta, Central Java. It serves as ari umbrella organi,zation and coordinating body for many militant and hard,line Islamic organizations and groups that are committed to the establishment of an Islamic state, such as Laskar Jihad (Holy War Force), Front Pembela Islam (Front of Defenders oflslam), Laskar Jundullah (Gods Army Paramilitary), Brigade Ta liban (Taliban Brigade). These Muslim militant groups operate openly and achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to demand· the com prehensive implementation of shariah, raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity, and most importantly, calling for jihad in Moluccas and other trouble spots in Indonesia. MMI has a broad membership, including prominent figures of Indonesian Muslim scholars and politicians who seek to bring about an Islamic state through peaceful and democratic means, such as Deliar Noer, Ali Yafie and A.M. Saefuddin. They are appointed members of ahl al-hall wa-al-aqd, literally means "those who have the power to bind and unbind," a kind of supreme body of organization that resembles the advisory council. MMI has a paramilitary wing as well named Laskar Mujahidin (Mujahidin Para :-military), which has trained its members in guerrilla technique and sent them for a jihad in the Moluccas in 2000. The most likely place to train the fighters is Hudaibiyah camp in Mindanao, where they are given instruction on using weapons and bombs. A few hundred of their meinbers possibly gained a combat experience in Afghanistan and many more are likely to have fought in the southern Philippines (Bruinessen, 2002: 7) .
According to the radicals, JI should remain underground until the time was ripe to move toward an Islamic state. Sungkar has frequently said that the struggle oflndonesian Muslim is comparable to that of the Prophet in Mecca, who had adopted a strategy of working in secret. Therefore, any attempt to struggle openly for an Islamic state oflndonesia was likely to be crushed by the enemies oflslam Gones, 2005a: 3). They retorted that the political system might more open, but it was still controlled by secular government, and it is dangerous for a clandestine organization to exist side by side with an open one, particularly with an overlapping mem-bership. The radicals argued that any accommodation with a non-Islamic political system could contaminate the faithful members of JI ( Jones, 2004: 3).
The rift among JI members was also reflected in their disagreement over when, where and how to wage jihad. A key fault line was between those associated with Hambali, a leader of Mantiqi I, including most of the people involved in the Bali and JW Marriott bombings, who have been · influebced by al,Qaedas 1998 fatwa urging attacks . on·westem targets, and Abu Fatih, a leader of Mantiqi II, who sees the fatwas implementation. as inappropriate for Indonesia and jeopardizing the longer,term s . trategy of creating an Islamic state through education and religious outreach. Abu Fatih also questioned whether there was a clear enemy to fight in Indonesia, which was very different from Afghanistan, for exarn.ple, where Muslims had clearly been attacked by the Soviet Union. This stance was also shared by Salamat Hashim, a leader of MILF Qones, 2004: 3) . The issue of the religious and tactical merit of pursuing violent jihad remains a primary source of tension within JI organization. Sidney Jones says that JI is frag,menting, with factions conducting their own operations with little or no reference to the central leadership Oones, 2003: 31) .
Conclusion
The influence of the DI movement on JI is unmistakable and shows us that contemporary Middle Eastern influences are not required to create a violent jihadist movement in Indonesia. Such influences may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for . the rise �f extremism. Local factors, such as socio,economic marginalization· and :political alienation also play a powerful role. Thus it is misleading to see JI as purely, or even predominantly, a product of . external and particularly Middle Eastern influences. JI is more accurately characterized as a hybrid of local and inter, national forces. It has been molded by the deep and bitter historical experience of radical Muslims in Indonesia, overlaid �ith global jihadist tendencies. It has distinctive local quality. It is a hallmark of al,Qaeda that it is able to inspire organizations such as JI and draw th�m into· its network, while also allowing those groups to pursue their more parochial agendas .
. In my opinion, Jis concept of a South,East Asian s: �per,state, forming part of a global Islamic caliphate, is flawed. The overwhelming majority of the population oflndonesia, and ofSouth,EastAsia m0re broadly, appears to reje � t Jis vision and its -use of violence to further its aims. The region has seen how JI is prepared to damage regional economics in pursuit of its own ideological goals. Nation,states and nationalism are also major hurdles. Jis ultimate aim of uniting Soµth,East under one Islamic leadership denies the widely acceptable modern political systems of the regions. The regions have adopted nation,states as the viable political systems governing the life of their citizens; changing it into Islamic caliphate of South,East Asia will create huge disruption, a consequence that will be . avoided by. the government of the regions. Moreover, different historical roots and distinct agendas of its potential allies in South,East Asia effectively hamper the idea of creating a unified South,East Asian Islamic state. JI relies on ope, rational cooperation with other radical organizations in the region, based on shared values and ties forged overseas or while waging militant jihad in inter,communal conflicts in the regions. However, JI does not command the obedience of these other organizations. Even within JI there is division over how and where to wage jihad and differences over the appropriateness of targeting civilians.
Postscript
Before the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, I was not aware _ of the existence of JI in Indonesia. I thought that JI is only a scapegoat created by CIA to press Indonesian government to join the American global campaign against terrorism. Until Bali artack, Indonesian government officials acknowledgedJis presence elsewhere, but denied its �xistence in Indonesia. The Government attributed the attack to al,Qaeda, not JI, hoping to place the blame on foreigners, not Indonesian themselves. Even our previous vice president, Hamzah Haz, demanded the media not to make hasty connection between the Bali attack and his friend, Abu Bakar Baasyir. However, the investigation over the bombing led to the arrest of over thirty suspects, many of whom had very strong links with Baasyir. It is true that during the investigation, all the suspects denied their link with Baasyir, let alone acknowledged him to be the leader of JI. However the former leader ofMantiqi III, Nasir Abas, mentioned in his book that for the sake of the organization security, once they got caught, JI members would deny their membership in this clandestine organization. Baasyir might not involve directly in the bombings, and the perpetrators acted on their own initiatives. However, if he is proven to be an Amir of JI, however weak his leadership might be, there is no reason to let him free. Under the pressure from Amen.:.
